Hazards to effective due diligence by BENOLIEL, Michael
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
1-2015 
Hazards to effective due diligence 
Michael BENOLIEL 
Singapore Management University, mbenoliel@smu.edu.sg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons 
Citation 
BENOLIEL, Michael. Hazards to effective due diligence. (2015). Eurasian Journal of Business and 
Management. 3, (1), 1-7. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4762 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
 
 
 
Eurasian Journal of Business and Management, 3(1), 2015, 1-7 
DOI: 10.15604/ejbm.2015.03.01.001 
 
 
EURASIAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND 
MANAGEMENT 
 
http://www.eurasianpublications.com 
 
 
 
HAZARDS TO EFFECTIVE DUE DILIGENCE  
 
Michael Benoliel 
Singapore Management University, Singapore. Email: mbenoliel@smu.edu.sg 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is not surprising that many business deals fail to realize their expected future value because 
some deal makers fail to perform effective due diligence. Successful deal makers, however, 
know that due diligence is one of the most important tasks in successful deal making. Thus, 
they avoid the psychological and contextual traps that cause poor due diligence. In this article, I 
describe the hazards – the psychological biases and contextual factors – that might affect the 
due diligence task. These hazards include information availability bias; confirmation bias; over-
confidence bias; time pressure; self-interested agents; deal fever; narrow focus; and complexity. 
Following this review, I provide a number of suggestions to help deal makers and organizations 
overcome these hazards.         
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1. Introduction 
 
While there are multiple factors that explain why many deals fail to realize their expected value, 
this failure is largely attributed to poor due diligence than to other lapses in the other elements 
of the deal making process (Aiello and Watkins, 2000).  In a recent survey, two hundred and fifty 
global executives, involved in mergers and acquisitions, admitted that there were breakdowns in 
their due-diligence processes where important deal-related issues were not detected (Harding 
and Rovit, 2004a).In the $5.8 billion acquisition of Rubbermaid by Newell, for example, Newell 
failed to discover that Rubbermaid “perfumed” itself to smell better than it actually did: it stuffed 
its distribution channels through heavy promotions and offered deep discounts. In 2002, Newell 
wrote off $500 million in good will leading its former CEO and chairman to admit: “We paid too 
much” (Harding and Rovit, 2004b, p.121). 
Conducting an effective due diligence process plays a major role in successful deal 
making. A study of 1,700 mergers and interviews with deal makers shows that executives who 
led high performing mergers conducted effective due diligence (Harding and Yale, 2002). 
Successful deal makers such as, Bain & Company, a top-tier private equity firm; Cinven, a 
leading European private equity firm; and Nestle, a Swiss conglomerate, avoided the traps of 
poor due diligence by using a disciplined process.  
Due diligence is broadly defined as a data collection and analysis process designed to 
help negotiators to effectively assess potential deals. In this paper, I identify some of the 
hazards to effective due diligence and suggest how to overcome them.  
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2. Information Availability Bias 
 
Deal makers tend to distinguish between information that is easily available, usually collected 
from secondary sources (e.g., corporate annual reports or industry outlook studies) and 
information that is not easily available usually collected from primary sources (e.g., direct 
information from customers, suppliers, lenders, or employees). Deal makers who are 
susceptible to information availability bias, limit the data collection effort to secondary sources of 
information that are easily available, and consequently make decisions that are based on a 
limited set of data.  
John Connaughton, the former managing director with Bain Capital, had observed that 
often managers rely on secondary sources of information, such as industry studies. At Bain 
capital, he said, “We throw out the secondary research associated with the outlook for the 
business and build our point of view from the bottom up” (Harding and Rovit, 2004a, p.65). A 
bottom up process means collecting information from primary sources, including data from the 
field. This is what Cinven, a leading European private equity firm, did prior to acquiring Odeon 
Cinemas, a United Kingdom theater chain. Cinven sent its own teams of analysts to the field – 
to “hang out at the movies” –and to collect information on each theater site. With the feet on the 
ground, Cinven was better able to analyze Odeon and assess its financial value (Harding and 
Rovit, 2004a, p.78).  
Effective deal makers act like detectives. They understand the power of primary data 
and do not assume that it is not available. This was the case with Sumner Redstone before he 
competed successfully to acquire Viacom. The CEO of Viacom at that time, Terrance A. Elkes 
and his management group wanted to takeover Viacom. As insiders, they had a significant 
information advantage over Redstone, just an outsider stockholder. Redstone, recognizing his 
information disadvantage, acted like a detective and went to collect data from primary sources. 
He wrote:  
 
I decided to go around them [Elkes and his management group]. I met with Bob  
Pittman [an insider], who had helped to create MTV [a business unit of Viacom]… 
and picked his brain. He told me MTV had become a very unpopular place to work 
in the year since Viacom had bought it. Morale was extremely low and people were  
leaving in droves (Redstone, 2001, p.125).  
 
Redstone, through Pittman’s connections, met other insiders, Tom Freston, the co-
president of MTV [after Pittman left MTV] and Geraldine Laybourne, the president of 
Nickelodeon [also a business unit of Viacom]. In a dinner with them, Redstone got important 
financial information such as, “MTV business was just getting started and was making $15 
million on $80 million in revenues” (Redstone, 2001, p.126).   
  
3. Confirmation Bias  
 
Deal makers, as most humans, are naturally motivated by their need to confirm their own 
preconceived ideas, values, and preferences. Thus, they tend to exclude non-confirming 
information. When deal makers believe that certain businesses are attractive and fall in love 
with them before they analyze them, they are susceptible to compromising the integrity of the 
due diligence process. This tendency is reinforced when someone at the top of the organization 
falls in love with a deal and signals to the deal team that “we are going to do this deal.” In this 
kind of a situation, Aiello and Watkins (2000, p.102) observed, the deal team will stretch the 
operating assumptions in order to justify the deal and the rigor of the risk analysis will be 
compromised, particularly the downside analysis by using optimistic assumptions (Eccles et al. 
1999).This, it seems, was the case in the failed acquisition of a leasing company by Fidelity 
National Financial. The due diligence process, according to Brent Bickett, a veteran investment 
banker, broke down because “The desire to get into the industry overrode the attractiveness of 
the company” (Harding and Rovit, 2004a, p.168).   
Benoit Bassi, the managing director of Bridgepoint Capital in Paris, is different. He is 
aware of the hazard of the confirmation bias and the affect heuristic – the tendency to minimize 
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the risks and costs of something that we like and exaggerate its benefits (Kahneman et al. 
2011). Bassi did not fall in love with the companies that he targeted for acquisition. For instance, 
after courting Fruit Co, a European company for months and later subjecting it to a rigorous due 
diligence for several weeks, he found many worms. He himself killed the deal. “When we got in 
there to do our due diligence,” he said, “what we thought we knew turned out to be wrong” 
(Harding and Rovit, 2004a, p.61). 
  
4. Overconfidence Bias 
 
Hubris or overconfidence is a cognitive bias that can influence decisions (Kahneman et 
al.1982). It is generally defined as exaggerated self-confidence (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) 
in regard to one’s judgment. Prior studies found that overconfident CEOs are prone to 
information judgment error because they believe that “they hold more information than they 
actually have” (Li and Tang, 2010, p.4), consider their own information more valuable than 
external information (Bernardo and Welch, 2001), and make decisions based more on 
subjective judgment than on objective information (March and Shapira, 1992). They also tend to 
underestimate the resources that are required to embark successfully on strategic initiatives 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that in 
making deals, overconfident CEOs pay higher premiums and end up with more value-destroying 
deals.  
The former President of Israel, Shimon Peres, has been negotiating diplomatic and 
political deals for more than 60 years. He believes that deal makers are prone to making two 
types of mistakes: overestimating or underestimating their counterparts and the situation 
(personal communication). Overconfident deal makers would underestimate their counterparts 
and the situation. Terrance A. Elkes, the former CEO of Viacom was overconfident and he 
underestimated Sumner Redstone, his competitor. When Elkes and his management group 
attempted to privately take over the company, Redstone, a small shareholder, was outraged!  
Although just a small investor and largely unknown, he decided to compete for Viacom which he 
did successfully. Later in his book he wrote: “I was unknown, just some theatre owner who had 
struck it rich with a couple of stock purchases. Elkes and his group didn’t know me and they 
never took the time to find out who I was. I believe they underestimated me, never for a minute 
took me seriously” (Redstone, 2001, pp.121-122).  
 
5. Time Pressure  
 
The more time a party has to research the other party, the better the discovery would be. 
Sellers, aware of the time-discovery disadvantage, sometimes use time pressure tactics to limit 
the discovery of information. In the case of Newell and Rubbermaid, the executives of 
Rubbermaid, the acquired company, gave Newell, the acquiring company, an exclusive right to 
close the deal quickly and only three weeks to do the due diligence. Newell, under enormous 
time pressure “raced through the due-diligence process” (Harding and Rovit, 2004a, p.73) and 
failed to discover that Rubbermaid “perfumed” itself. As was discovered later, Rubbermaid 
stuffed its distribution channels by offering deep discounts, had a poor customer service record, 
and weak management. 
In another case, Kirk Kerkorian, an experienced deal maker, also used a time pressure 
tactic when he was ready to sell Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and United Artists (MGM/UA). He called 
Ted Turner, the founder of CNN, telling him that he is planning to put MGM/UA up for auction in 
two weeks, and would give him the first right to buy the asset for $1.5 billion, provided Turner 
would submit an offer in ten days. Turner, eager to make the deal, rushed to meet the deadline 
and signed a purchase agreement at full price of $1.5 billion. Not only that Turner, according to 
industry analysts, overpaid by 200 to 300 million dollars, his team failed to uncover important 
issues such as: the deal between Rainbow Services and MGM/UA that already locked up all 
cable rights; and the deal between HBO and MGM/UA to buy several movies at a very 
advantageous rate (Goldberg and Goldberg, 1995, p.355). 
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6. Self-Interested Agents 
 
Due diligence in complex transactions is particularly challenging because the parties do not 
have the necessary knowledge and expertise to conduct sophisticated financial, legal, or 
technical, due diligence. For example, in most complex mergers or acquisitions, the parties are 
dependent on the services of expert-agents such as investment bankers and lawyers. Another 
problem is the compensation structure. Agents, such as investment bankers or real estate 
professionals, typically get paid only if deals close, regardless of the future value of the deals. In 
a number of cases, self-interested agents “pushed” questionable deals. For example, Rawson 
Food Services, on the advice of Prudential-Bache, its financial advisor, paid about $40 million to 
acquire 43 supermarkets from Pantry Pride Enterprises, Inc.  As it turned out, shortly after the 
deal was done, Rawson Food Services filed for bankruptcy reorganization and sued Prudential-
Bache for negligence. Rawson argued in the Florida state court that Pantry Pride was worth 
substantially less than what it had paid for. The court found Prudential-Bache guilty of 
negligence and awarded Rawson $26.3 million in punitive and compensatory damages (Kosnik 
and Shapiro, 1997).  
In another case, First Boston, the financial advisor of Campeau, a Canadian investor, 
received $12 million in agency fee for advising Campeau on the acquisition of Federated 
Department Stores (Kosnik and Shapiro, 1997) and in less than two years after the deal closed, 
Campeau declared bankruptcy (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).    
The rating agencies, Standard and Poor, and Moody’s, are perceived as independent 
and trusted agents of the investing public. Many private and institutional investors trust the due-
diligence of the rating agencies and make investment decisions based on their ratings.  In 2008, 
however, the public discovered that the rating agencies rated risky bonds as triple A (“AAA”) 
because they were not independent. They are financially dependent on Wall Street. For rating 
each deal, the rating agencies received fat fees from Goldman Sacks and other Wall Street 
firms (Lewis, 2010, p.73).  The “independent” rating agencies did not even have their own model 
of rating bonds; they relied on Wall Street firms that packaged the bonds to “send over their own 
model…[and] somehow, roughly 80 percent of what had been risky triple-B- rated bonds now 
looked like triple-A-rated bonds” (Lewis, 2010, p.76). 
 
7. Deal Fever  
 
Not only may external agents be driven by self-interested motivations, internal negotiators may 
as well. Robert Kohlhepp, the vice chairman and former CEO of Cintas, highlights the hazard of 
deal fever – the tendency to get deals done – because the internal merger and acquisition units, 
for example, are evaluated on the basis of the number of deals that get done. The internal 
operation units also like to do many deals because they want to grow their areas of operation 
and increase their potential income.  
Deal fever is promoted by parties who stand to benefit immediately from the deals as 
they close, regardless of the future consequences. In fact, the entire American financial sector 
was driven by unchecked frenzy of deal fever leading to the global financial crises in 2008. The 
race for immediate financial rewards, regardless of the consequences, was indeed relentless. 
Wall Street firms, standing to benefit immediately as deals close, raced to purchase mortgages, 
bundled them into highly complex securities, and sold them as securitized bonds to investors 
who were unable to assess their risks. The quality of the countless deals in terms of creating 
future value was not considered. Unfortunately, the investors themselves, unable to do due 
diligence on the purposely bundled and complex securitized mortgages, were also caught in 
deal fever frenzy.   
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8. Narrow Focus 
 
The due diligence task is sometimes narrowly focused on a few issues like financial and legal 
matters, ignoring important issues such as, cultural values and practices.  
A study of 125 mergers and acquisitions that were greater than $1 billion between 1996 
and 2000 by Bain & Company, found that “cultural-integration issues can make or break deals” 
(Harding and Rovit, 2004a, p.112). In the joint venture between a French company and a 
Swedish company, for example, an important cultural practice went undetected. The agreement 
between the French and Swedish companies stipulated that the French company would own 
50.01 percent equity, and the chairman of the newly formed joint venture would come from the 
French company. The Swedish company, on the other hand, would own 49.99 percent equity 
and the CEO of the joint venture would come from the Swedish company. What the Swedish 
deal makers failed to realize and investigate was that in France a chairman of a company, 
known as President Directeur General (PDG) usually acts as both, as chairman and as CEO, 
getting deeply involved in strategic issues as well as in the daily operations of the business. The 
designated French PDG of the joint venture indeed got very involved in the strategic and in the 
tactical issues of the joint venture. Eventually, conflicts over roles and responsibilities of the 
French PDG and the Swedish formal CEO, who was relegated to a non-CEO role, erupted. 
Later the management of the Swedish firm admitted that “it did not do its homework” and had 
they understood how powerful the role of the French PGD was, it would never have agreed that 
the chairman would come from the French firm (Inkpen and Li, 1999, p.40). 
 
9. Complexity 
 
In some cases, the due diligence task is nearly impossible because of the complex nature of the 
asset that is involved in the deal, for example, a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO).  A CDO 
is a tower like structure of assembled debt obligations of mortgage bonds.  Each mortgage bond 
is a bundle of thousands of mortgage loans and one hundred bonds create a CDO.  The CDO 
tower like structure is based on the bonds ratings and yield. The riskiest bonds that are rated 
triple-B (“BBB”) are placed in the lower floors of the CDO tower. This system of bundling 
thousands of mortgage loans together makes it extremely difficult to do due diligence because 
the CDO tower simply cannot be unbundled. Commenting on this complexity, Alan Greenspan, 
the former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, said:  
 
I have got some fairly heavy background in mathematics…But some of the complexities 
of the instruments that were going into CDOs bewildered me. I did not understand what 
they [Wall Street bankers] were doing or how they actually got the types of returns out 
of the mezzanines [the risky subprime mortgage bonds at the floor level of a CDO 
tower] and the various tranches [floors] of the CDO that they did. And I figured if I didn’t 
understand it and I had access to a couple hundred PhDs, how the rest of the world is 
going to understand it, sort of bewildered me (Sorkin, 2010, p.90).   
 
To make matters more complex, Wall Street firms created and used opaque 
terminology which was designed “less to convey meaning than to bewilder outsiders [investors 
outside of Wall Street]” (Lewis, 2010, p.126).  For example, a bond backed entirely by risky 
subprime mortgages was not called a subprime mortgage bond. Instead, it was called an asset-
backed security. The low level floor in a CDO was made of risky low rated subprime mortgage 
bonds. However, it was called differently -- mezzanine.  In order not to mention the word 
subprime, the mezzanine layer of the subprime mortgages was not called subprime-backed 
CDO. It had a different name -- a structured finance CDO (Lewis, 2010, p.127). Such 
terminology was designed to obscure and not to clarify.  
Bundling thousands of mortgages into a single and complex CDO which couldn’t be 
unbundled made it difficult for investors to find out what was in each CDO. This complexity 
“suggested that most investors were simply skipping this stage of their due diligence” (Lewis, 
2010, p.130).  Sophisticated deal makers, like Warren Buffet, never got into the CDOs business.  
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10. Successful Due Diligence 
 
Successful deal makers are aware of the hazards to ineffective due diligence and thus develop 
a disciplined due diligence mindset and process. Here are some suggestions: 
 
 Collect information from primary and secondary sources of information and act like a 
detective; do not assume that information from primary sources is not available.  
 Create a diverse deal team, including an internal or external devil’s advocate in order to 
challenge assumptions and preconceived beliefs.  
 Restrain hubris by focusing on objective data and by involving independent and 
trustworthy experts. 
 Negotiate realistic and favorable time frames for thorough due diligence and challenge 
arbitrarily set deadlines.  
 Select carefully trustworthy agents who act strategically by focusing on creating present 
and future value for their principals.  
 Restrain deal fever by using contingent contracts that reward deal makers for closing 
deals as well as for creating future value. Furthermore, separate between deal 
negotiation and deal approval. 
 Broaden the scope of the due diligence task and include diverse “hard” and “soft” 
relevant issues (e.g., financial, legal, technical, cultural, and human resources). 
 Be aware of highly complex deals that are more confusing than clarifying and use well 
qualified and trusted experts to help perform the due diligence task.    
 
10. Conclusions 
 
Successful deal makers know that effective due diligence is perhaps one of the most important 
tasks in creating successful deals. Some deal makers, however, fail to recognize the 
psychological and contextual hazards to effective due diligence because they are prone to 
psychological biases and contextual traps.  For example, they fail to collect information from 
primary and reliable sources of information, tend to collect selective information that confirms 
their pre-conceived beliefs, and value their subjective information more than external 
information. In these cases, deal makers should:  (1) recognize that critical information is to be 
found in primary sources; (2) promote a strong culture of devil’s advocacy in order to challenge 
assumptions and preconceived beliefs; and (3) learn how to restrain their hubris and appreciate 
humility.    
It takes time to perform well the due diligence task. At times, however, some negotiators 
purposely set arbitrary and short time frames for their counterparts in order to prevent a full 
discovery.  Successful deal makers know that it takes time to discover potential “perfumed pigs” 
and thus negotiate enough time for discovery, never rushing this process.    
Short and arbitrary deadlines are perhaps more risky when self-interested agents are 
involved in the negotiations. In many cases, it is not possible to dispense with the services of an 
agent. In such cases, they must be selected carefully to ensure that they are trustworthy and 
committed to pursuing the interests of their principals.   
Not only may external agents be possessed by deal fever and self-interest motivations, 
principals may be possessed by these as well. Organizations, therefore, should create a reward 
system that is based on future value creation, and also separate deal negotiation from deal 
approval.    
Lastly, due diligence has been limited to legal and financial discovery and analysis, 
often excluding other areas like cultural values and practices. The due diligence task should be 
comprehensive and include all the relevant issues that might affect the future value of a deal 
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